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TRADE INTEGRATION IN TURBULENT TIMES
By: Petros C. Mavroidis, CLS*
ABSTRACT
The WTO has been going through an existential crisis, from which it is like
that it will not exit unscathed. If it is to remain an organization of universal
membership, it will have to content itself to shallow integration. Its continuing
policy relevance, will largely depend on the choices it will make about the nature
of its own integration process. The good news is that no one can simply walk
away from globalization. The downside (for the WTO) is that globalization is
being increasingly administered through bilateral contracts.
I. THE END OF HISTORY AND THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLES
Imagine for a moment that we are in a time warp back to the beginning of
1995, less than thirty years ago, the day of the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) advent. Its advent coincided time-wise with the apex of economic
liberalism. During this time Francis Fukuyama, a renown political scientist,
announced the end of history with the definitive end of the Cold War, which he
believed was because of the prevalence and dominance of liberal economics. 1
This is also the time when economist John Williamson coined the term
“Washington consensus” to denote an increasing persuasion across
governmental actors that they should be pursuing macroeconomic discipline,
market economy, and openness to the world through liberalization of trade and

* Edwin B. Parker Professor of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia School of Law; Professor
of Law, University of Neuchâtel. For many helpful discussions on this issue, and comments on
previous drafts, I would like to thank Bill Davey, Bernard M. Hoekman, Doug Nelson, Alexis
Pearson, André Sapir, and Alan O. Sykes.
1
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xi (1992). According to
Torbjørn Knutsen, the term “end of history” was popularized by Alexandre Kojève, a French
philosopher. Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Answered Prayers: Fukuyama, Liberalism and the End-ofHistory Debate, 22 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 77, 77 (1991). Knutsen used the term for a different
reason, namely, to refer to the time when European history realized its potential. Id. at 77 n.4.
Kojève was a member of the French delegation that negotiated the GATT. See Robert Howse,
Kojeve’s Latin Empire, HOOVER INST. (Aug, 1, 2004), https://www.hoover.org/research/kojeveslatin-empire [https://perma.cc/BLS6-558K].
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foreign direct investment (FDI).2 The ensuing policy changes at the national
level, the agreed monumental trade liberalization during the Uruguay round—
hand-in-hand with technological evolutions (especially in bringing transport
costs down) opened the way to global value chains (GVCs)—and reduced
distance across nations to the lowest point ever in world history. To borrow an
often-heard aphorism, the world started to look increasingly flat, and maybe
even lopsided as the large economic-liberalism snowball made its way towards
those at the other end. Proponents of centrally-planned economies were
definitely losing the battle.
Legal scholars explored the same vein a few years before when Jackson
observed an irreversible trend towards rules-based (as opposed to power-driven)
diplomacy.3 The liberal world order had never felt more secure, as it was
predicated on third-party adjudication, where gunboat diplomacy had no place.
Trade integration had certainly contributed to all that. In fact, a multilateral
trade institution called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
one of the major pillars of the world liberal order.4 The GATT successfully
generated and administered trade liberalization in the post-WWII era, its birth
defects notwithstanding. It blossomed into an important organization during the
Cold War, and even attracted a few “Eastern bloc” countries that joined it,
provoking a dent across what Winston Churchill had termed the countries behind
the Iron Curtain.5 The GATT thus emerged as an important part of the
equilibrium of international relations in the post WWII era.6 It was only natural
See John Williamson, Did the Washington Consensus Fail?, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.,
https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/did-washington-consensus-fail
[https://perma.cc/WF69-B22V]; John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington
Consensus, 27 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195, 195–96 (2004). Walter Russell Mead, Professor of
Foreign Affairs at Bard College, paints the wider picture when stating that this model of governance
also included “[s]elf-determination, the rule of law between and within countries, liberal
economics, and the protection of human rights.” Walter Russell Mead, The End of the Wilsonian
Era: Why Liberal Internationalism Failed, FOREIGN AFFS., https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/united-states/2020-12-08/end-wilsonian-era [https://perma.cc/R2Y2-3AYZ].
3
John H. Jackson, GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY IN THE
1980S 159, 162 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
4
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
5
Churchill was referring to all countries of Eastern Europe, and not just Eastern Germany, from
Bulgaria and Romania, all the way to the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). See Winston
Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, The Sinews of Peace (“Iron Curtain Speech”) (Mar. 5, 1946), in
https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/
[https://perma.cc/7CSB-7DN6].
6
Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Contribution to Economic Recovery In Post-War Western Europe
2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 4944, 1994); The WTO Can . . . Contribute to
Peace and Stability, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 10thi_e/10thi09_e.
htm [https://perma.cc/4AUJ-WVTA]. There are various accounts discussing the importance of
GATT in maintaining equilibrium within international relations, and two stand out: see BENN
STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN 172–73 (2018) quoting press statements and newspaper articles
praising the GATT’s impact on international economic relations; and see THOMAS W. ZEILER,
FREE TRADE FREE WORLD 1–2 (1999) stating “GATT . . . proved more adaptable to the demands
of wartime sustenance, recovery, economic restoration, and, above all, the Cold War.”
2
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that nations renewed their commitment to liberal trade policies by strengthening
and expanding it.
The GATT honored its mandate. Successive official publications by the
WTO—the annual World Trade Reports7—have established that trade
integration has been progressing at a steady pace since the inception of the
GATT.8 It was born with birth defects because its umbrella organization, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), never saw the light of day, as the
Truman Administration never submitted the ITO Charter for ratification to U.S.
Congress.9 An ITO without U.S. participation therein was simply unthinkable.10
The GATT thus had to invent its institutional apparatus, and transform itself
from an international agreement into an international organization. 11 An
argument during this time was if a crippled GATT could bring about a
multilateral liberal order during the Cold War-era, then what could a new GATT
structured as a genuine international organization buoyed by the support of the
whole world and created at the end of the Cold War achieve?
The WTO’s inception came at about the same time the Berlin Wall fell, the
Cold War finished and liberalism peaked.12 With the support of an everincreasing number of states, what seemed utopian before was suddenly another
typical day in the office when 123 trading nations agreed to the WTO.13 This
was a heterogeneous group of countries comprising the Norways and
Switzerlands of this world, but also developing and least-developed countries
(LDCs), and some former communist countries who, following the fall of the
Berlin Wall, were negotiating accession to the European Union (EU).14 The best
was yet to come: China’s WTO membership. China had started its accession
negotiation to the WTO during the Uruguay round, and Russia did the same
while the ink on the Final Act of the Uruguay round had not dried. 15 The
7

See generally World Trade Report, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/ res_e/reser_e/wtr_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/QBJ8-R494].
8
1998 Press Releases: Golden Jubilee of the Multilateral Trading System, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr88_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5YJ4-36Q7];
CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, RACHEL F. FEFER & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R45417, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: OVERVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTION 62 (2020) (“The
broadened membership of the WTO [since GATT] has promoted greater integration of emerging
markets . . . in the global economy . . . .”).
9
1 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 331 (5th ed. 2019).
10
See Susan Ariel Aaronson, From GATT to WTO: The Evolution of an Obscure Agency to One
Perceived as Obstructing Democracy, ECON. HIST. SERVS., https://eh.net/encyclopedia/from-gattto-wto-the-evolution-of-an-obscure-agency-to-one-perceived-as-obstructing-democracy-2/
[https://perma.cc/K9X8-G2B4] (“The US Congress never brought membership in the ITO to a vote,
and when the president announced that he would not seek ratification . . . the ITO effectively
died.”).
11
BHALA, supra note 9, at 332.
12
Id. at 364.
13
After eight years of negotiation in the Uruguay Round, the GATT was updated by the Marrakesh
Agreement to create the WTO. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
14
BHALA, supra note 9, at 369.
15
For further discussion, see generally PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ANDRE S APIR, CHINA AND THE
WTO (2021) [hereinafter MAVROIDIS & SAPIR].
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multilateral trade organization was the vindication par excellence of Francis
Fukuyama, and the tangible proof that the “Washington consensus” was now
relevant beyond the Beltway.
The WTO was, of course, the successor organization and new GATT, the
organizational expression of a rekindled commitment to all that the GATT stood
for. In retrospect though, the year 1995 marked the culmination point of
“Washington consensus.” At the time, it felt as if the best was yet to come.
Analysts saw a shortcut from increasing WTO membership to transformation of
formally centrally-planned economies into market economies, and even an
espousal of democratic values in countries like China.16 Optimism was
unfettered.17
A common measure to understand trade integration is the trade openness
index: it adds imports and exports in goods and services and divides this sum by
the global GDP (gross domestic product).18 The larger the ratio, the more any
given country is exposed to international trade. The data provided by the reputed
Peterson Institute of International Economics (PIIE) suggests that between
1860-1914 (the industrialization era) trade openness was measured at 17.6; and
in the interwar period between World War I and World War II at 18.19 Following
the GATT’s inception, between 1947 and the end of the century, the index
moved from 10.1 to 39.5. In the WTO years, it moved to 61.5, and only recently
it has been in retreat, moving from 61.5 to 53.5.20
Globalization and trade integration were supposed to be a one-way street,
but they failed. Instead, new terms have entered the world trade lexicon, for
example, “slowbalization” is meant to denote the retreat of globalization.21 A
term unknown a few years back and unthinkable in 1995 is now omni-present in
writings about international relations.22 Less than thirty years since the apex of
globalization, slowbalization was not the only bad news, as far as trade
integration at the WTO-level was concerned. In chronological order, the
following events and circumstances cropped up and changed the idyllic picture
described above:
16

Id.
It is not that everyone agreed that the world community was entering a one-way street. Writing
years before it all happened, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May had warned about discontinuity
being an inherent element of human thinking and history. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R.
MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION MAKERS 263 (1986).
18
The World Bank publishes data concerning trade openness of countries regularly. See Trade (%
of GDP), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS [https://
perma.cc/3EUM-G8CD].
19
Douglas A. Irwin, Globalization is in Retreat for the First Time Since the Second World War,
PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/
globalization-retreat-first-time-second-world-war [https://perma.cc/5PL7-XTNQ].
20
Id.
21
Luca D’Urbino, The Steam Has Gone Out of Globalisation, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/01/24/the-steam-has-gone-out-of-globalisation
[https://perma.cc/8DEK-FT5A].
22
See, e.g., Globalisation Making Way for ‘Slowbalization’, Says K M Birla, BUS. STANDARD (Jan.
14, 2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies /globalisation-makingway-for-slowbalization-says-k-m-birla-120011401177_1.html [https://perma.cc/D5R6-UJ5Z].
17
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The WTO exhibited a moribund legislative function and has not
managed to add much to its legislative arsenal since 1995.23 The
promise that a reinvigorated trade organization will generate the next
legislative arsenal to support future trade integration proved futile.24
Reduced legislative activity, over time, should have impacted its
judiciary function as well. However, as described below, this did not
occur. It complicated its own goal in 2001 when it opened talks for a
new round at the same time as China—the biggest challenge in terms of
accession of new member that it had ever faced—was acceding to the
WTO.25 No delegation, not even those of the biggest players could
realistically simultaneously focus on two very demanding challenges;26
The financial crisis of 2008 had a major impact on international trade.27
Trade flows were reduced significantly, and various measures of
dubious consistency with the WTO appeared worldwide.28 The WTO
was certainly not prepared for this. The WTO legislative arsenal had
not made any provision for similar occurrences even though financial
crises do occur, and do impact trade. The Keynesian logic that the
government should supply the resources in order to stimulate growth
again and get out of the recession gained pace worldwide. But similar
actions in the WTO vernacular are termed “subsidies,”29 and subsidies
can be counteracted. The WTO, its institutional deficiencies in this
respect notwithstanding, managed to resist the financial crisis without
major hiccups, largely thanks to the restraint that its members showed.30
They did not ask questions about the legality of subsidization, and did
not resort to counteracting them through countervailing duties. At least
not in big numbers. It would be an exaggeration though, to claim that
the WTO emerged unscathed from this experience;
The WTO judiciary function was dealt a severe blow when the Trump
Administration undermined its monopoly to adjudicate multilateral
trade disputes. The Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO, the much revered
second instance court of the world trading regime, became de facto nonoperational for any dispute submitted to it after December 2019 when

CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 212
(2013).
24
See id. at 213 (detailing the WTO’s position against voting).
25
See BHALA, supra note 9, at 437.
26
See id. at 443–44 (discussing the complexity to China’s integration into the WTO and subsequent
shortcomings other countries faced).
27
See generally Andrei A. Levchenko, Logan T. Lewis & Linda L. Tesar, The Collapse of
International Trade During the 2008–09 Crisis, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 214 (2010).
28
See WORLD TRADE ORG., AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009, at 26 (2009),
https://www.wto.org/ english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade09_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C4Q-ZB9K].
29
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
30
U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. & Japan External Trade Org., International Trade After the
Economic Crisis, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/2, at xi (2010).
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the term for two of its last three remaining members expired.31 By
statutory fiat, it needs three members to function.32 It dwindled down to
one and became staff-less at the end of 2020.33 Starting in 2017, the
Trump administration blocked each and every request by incumbent AB
members for re-appointment.34 And, eventually, a long simmering
tension came to boil in December 2019 when the AB was reduced to
one member. The hostile attitude adopted by the Trump administration
in 2017 was the proximate cause for the falling of the AB into
desuetude. It was hard to imagine that there would be no ripple effects,
or that the crisis of the WTO judiciary would be self-contained. More
than anything else, this has been the most de-stabilizing factor of the
WTO edifice. The U.S. administration has thus gone full circle from the
driving force of liberalization to the player most likely pulling the rug
out from under the multilateral edifice;
China proved to be more than what the WTO membership had
bargained for when the door to the Asian behemoth opened in 2001.35
Complaints about its behavior, both justified as well as unjustified, have
multiplied.36 The trading community did not manage to always address
complaints against China in a lawful manner (e.g., through litigation)
before the WTO, or by adding to the existing multilateral legislative
framework. The Trump administration again moved from initially
trading insults to eventually adopting a pugilistic attitude by entering
into tariff wars with China, ignoring the (potential) relevance of the
WTO.37 Unavoidably, the effects of the feud were not absorbed by the
two warring parties. Third parties suffered, along with the WTO, whose
role of exclusive adjudicator of trade disputes had been dealt a severe
blow;38

Adam Behsudi & Finbarr Bermingham, The End of World Trade As We Know It, POLITICO (Nov.
20, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/20/world-trade-end-donald-trump-07
2257 [https://perma.cc/37ER-ZZ4W].
32
Jennifer Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, COUNCIL FOREIGN
RELS. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellate-body
[https://perma.cc/F2C6-L36K].
33
Appellate Body Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
ab_members_descrp_e.htm [https://perma.cc/EA2E-QPAN].
34
See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in
WTO Reform, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 703 (2020) for a detailed account of how it happened.
35
See What Happened When China Joined the WTO, WORLD101, https://world101.cfr.org/ globalera-issues/trade/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto [https://perma.cc/M5R7-F85G].
36
See id.
37
See Trump Attacks WTO After it Says US Tariffs on China Broke Global Trade Rules, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/trump-attacks-wtoafter-it-says-us-tariffs-on-china-broke-global-trade-rules [https://perma.cc/XQ69-2JYW].
38
The fact that U.S. tariffs had been imposed unilaterally, and hence, illegally, does not make the
Chinese unilateral tariffs against U.S. goods any less illegal. By acceding to the WTO, all members
accept to avoid taking justice into their own hands by using trade retaliation; they may retaliate
only when they had secured a multilateral finding of illegality by WTO courts. Understanding on
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COVID-19 arrived, which found the world community totally unprepared. The WTO was no exception. The pandemic is, of course, not
germane to the workings of the world trading system. Trade contributed
to its spreading all over the world, but it did not cause the pandemic.39
The volume of trade was yet again heavily reduced. 40 Worse,
established supply chains were disrupted because of the proliferation of
export restrictions on medical equipment.41 The WTO is counting on
instruments that it outlawed, or dissuaded at the very least (like
subsidies), to see some resurgence of trade in the short run.42 At a more
practical level, the WTO had to switch gears, slow down its already
substantially slowed down rhythm, move to virtual meetings, attempt to
address its portfolio and manage its day-to-day business;
After the trading community thought it saw it all in a short timespan, in
2020 Director-General (DG) Roberto Azevedo became the first head of

Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU]. See generally MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 15 for a discussion on the life of China in
the WTO so far, as well as what should be done about it to avoid undermining further the
multilateral regime. It should be added that the Trump administration’s trade policy towards China
is probably the only area in foreign economic policy where U.S. Democrats and Republicans see
eye-to-eye. See KISHORE MAHBUBANI, HAS CHINA WON? THE CHINESE CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN PRIMACY 29–30 (2020). The consensus regarding the China policy includes the U.S.
private sector as well, which backed President Trump. Id. at 25–26. As Mahbubani notes, the U.S.
private sector opposed the linking of improvements in the protection of human rights with granting
China MFN rights in the 1990s, but they are now behind the sanctions that former President Trump
has been imposing, even though, for example, the allegations concerning human rights violations
play second fiddle to China’s policies regarding technology transfer. See id.
39
A variety of trade scholars have concluded as much. See Richard E. Baldwin & Simon J. Evenett,
COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work, CEPR PRESS (2020),
https://voxeu.org/system/files/epublication/Covid-19_and_Trade_Policy.pdf [https:// perma.cc/
CU9D-BENE] for a collection examining the relationship between COVID-19 and international
trade flows.
40
The WTO webpage has been reporting in short intervals information on this score from March
2020 onwards. E.g., Goods Barometer Confirms Steep Drop in Trade but Hints at Nascent
Recovery,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/
wtoi_19aug20_e.htm [https://perma.cc/E5R4-BHWM]. By the end of October 2020, the original
forecast for reduction of trade by 12.9% had been revised downwards, and the new prediction was
around 9% reduction. See Trade Shows Signs of Rebound from COVID-19, Recovery Still
Uncertain, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/
pr862_e.htm [https://perma.cc/KD9R-UUP3]. Global Trade Alert contains precious information on
the impact of COVID-19 to world trade, as well as world trade institutions. See generally Simon J.
Evenett, Tackling Coronavirus, GLOB. TRADE ALERT, https://www.globaltradealert.org/
reports/download/50 [https://perma.cc/TE3B-ERHJ].
41
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY & CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 11551,
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 1 (2020).
42
The public health crisis as provoked should make stakeholders rethink the wisdom of the current
multilateral regulation of subsidies. See Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis, A Turquoise Mess:
Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies
Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 11, 12 (2014) for arguments in favor of amending the
current agreement.
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the institution to quit out of the blue before the end of his mandate.43 He
was not a transformative DG like Eric Wyndham-White,44 but also not
a transactional DG. He left the institution in a worse place than he had
found it seven years prior, and his legacy is forever tainted for his
decision to leave early. The DG’s departure came when the membership
had lost its leader, the U.S., who sometimes alone or with the assistance
of the EU or the Old Quad45 had steered the multilateral system towards
the completion of the first eight rounds.46 Following the conclusion of
the Uruguay round, the Old Quad—a relatively homogeneous group—
was replaced by the New Quad: Australia, Brazil, and India replaced
Canada and tested the homogeneity of the leadership.47 The emergence
of China, and the ensuing abandoning of any relevance of the New Quad
signaled the passage to a multi-polar, uncoordinated world. Ian
Bremners’ quip that we were entering a G-Zero world a few years ago
seems more and more in tune with today’s reality.48 A rudderless
WTO49 has been operating in an increasingly rudderless world.
These are not the only factors that caused the crisis at the WTO. The impact
of self-inflicted errors should not be neglected. To provide an illustration, DG
Azevedo stopped the practice of Green Room meetings where the leading
trading nations would informally exchange views.50 Green Room meetings had
43

Emma Farge & Philip Blenkinsop, Damaged WTO Now Leaderless as Chief Azevedo Steps
Down, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto/damaged-wtonow-leaderless-as-chief-azevedo-steps-down-idUSKBN25R170 [https://perma.cc/93M5-SNFF].
44
DG Wyndham-White steered the GATT into success following the ITO demise when the
GATT’s very existence was at stake and chaired six of the eight negotiating rounds completed
during the GATT-era. See generally Rogério De Souza Farias, Mr GATT: Eric Wyndham White
and the Quest for Trade Liberalization, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 463 (2013) for a discussion of his
accomplishments.
45
The Old Quad members were Canada, the EU, Japan, and the U.S. Membership, Alliances and
Bureaucracy, WORLD TRADE ORG. [hereinafter Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy],
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
org3_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/7RARDFWY].
46
VANGRASSTEK, supra note 23, at 83.
47
Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy, supra note 45. We do not insinuate identity.
Homogeneity means sharing basic features, a market economy, acknowledgment of property rights,
a belief in the rule of law, etc.
48
See IAN BREMNER, EVERY NATION FOR ITSELF: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN NO ONE LEADS THE
WORLD vii-viii (2013).
49
In fact, the first call to arms from the WTO came during the interregnum period, after DG
Azevedo had left Geneva, by his deputy, Alan Wolff, who in September 2020 called for planning
the post-COVID-19 world. Alan Wm. Wolff, DDG Wolff: WTO Reform Crucial to Restoring
Confidence in the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_21sep20_e.htm [https://perma.cc/RA2H-H86U].
50
DG Azevedo discontinued this practice early on in his first mandate. An official record is
provided of his speech during the July 2017 Informal Trade Negotiations Committee (the body
overlooking the negotiations, which customarily the DG chairs) when he stated: “So I decided that
instead of doing the Green Room that we used to do before I took office, I convened Informal
H[eads] O[f] D[elegation]s where everybody could be invited and could speak their minds about
anything.” Minutes of the Meeting, WORLD TRADE ORG. 111, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/
Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/M168.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5V3-J7NN].
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emerged as a key feature in promoting consensus within the WTO, and their
importance grew as membership (and heterogeneity) grew.51 They were replaced
with meetings where all participated, which increased negotiating costs
exponentially and unavoidably reduced the likelihood to reach agreement. DG
Azevedo might as well have issued an obituary to any hope of coordinating
national trade policies at this stage.52
All of the listed events were the proximate causes, and not the ultimate
causes, that caused the current crisis. Academic research suggests that we landed
in the current situation because of various heterogeneous factors, ranging from
domestic political choices (serving the interests of the rich at the expense of
workers and ordinary retirees)53 to the rise of populism and demagoguery. Trade
is usually the first target, or one of the priority targets, of populism. 54
All this has had a disintegrating impact on the WTO. Some of the factors
mentioned above had more immediate and dramatic effect, some less so. The
rise of export restrictions of medical equipment during COVID-19 and the
ensuing disruption of supply chains, as reported in Global Trade Alert, is a
recent factor.55 But the crisis that led to the demise of the WTO AB (the recourse
to subsidization during and after the financial crisis, etc.) all contributed to
undermining what the world trading community had been building since 1948
with the advent of the GATT.
Furthermore, these factors are not operating in clinical isolation from each
other. Disintegration has been accelerated because they appeared (almost)
simultaneously. For example, COVID-19 and the disruption of supply chains
came in 2019, at a rather inopportune moment, when the Appellate Body crisis
was at its peak. Unavoidably, it exacerbated an existing crisis.
51

Kent Jones, Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation, 9 PROGRESS IN DEV.
STUD. 349, 349 (2009).
52
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delegations to the WTO. Minutes of the Meeting, supra note 50, at 115.
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DOES GLOBALIZATION FUEL POPULISM? ECONOMICS, CULTURE, AND THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING
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A SHORT HISTORY OF BREXIT (2019) (discussing the events leading up to Brexit and focusing in
part of the influence of trade).
55
Simon J. Evenett, Tackling COVID-19 Together, GLOB. TRADE ALERT 2 (2020),
https://www.wita.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/TacklingCoronavirus.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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The future of the WTO and the world’s trading system are in limbo, with
scholars questioning what will happen next. The WTO could be reaching the end
of its life, leaving the trading community without a guide. The election of a new
leader gives hope of a more stable future for the WTO, but leadership is only
one facet. The WTO cannot legislate as it does not adjudicate anymore. At the
moment of writing, there are fifteen appeals against panel reports, which will
not be adjudicated since there is no AB to adjudicate them, leaving those
considering taking action wondering if there is a point to submitting an appeal
into the void.56 The two crises are interconnected, and resolving the judiciary
crisis is necessary, but not sufficient to resolving the WTO crisis. The resolution
of the legislative crisis is the key to ensuring the continuous policy relevance of
the WTO. There are basically two options available. The WTO membership
must choose: either remain reactive, and simply pick up the low-hanging fruits
from the FTA-agenda; or become proactive and attempt to legislate again. We
take these issues in turn, before we conclude.
II. WHY THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY CRISES ARE
INTERCONNECTED?
In a working paper for the European University Institute, Professor Bernard
Hoekman and myself argued that the legislative and judiciary crises are
interconnected.57 Here is why: if trade agreements continue to be signed in the
realm of free-trade areas (FTAs) legislation (as the recent comprehensive work
of the World Bank shows),58 then all WTO courts will adjudicate, giving rise to
disputes in twenty-five year old agreements. And this is the good scenario where
the crisis of the judiciary has been solved. In this scenario, the writing is on the
wall for the WTO. The trade agenda moved to FTAs and deep-trade agreements
(DTAs) largely because of the subject-matter.59 There is not much to be done in
the realm of tariff-protection, since the average tariff-level is very low indeed,
and concentrated in areas where for domestic political economy reasons
additional reductions are unlikely.60 Addressing behind-the-border protection
presupposes that trading partners share the concern, and the means to achieve it.
56
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Furthermore, there are no obvious quid pro quos: it is one thing to reduce the
tariff of widgets for gadgets; it is a different thing to negotiate on the optimal
regulation of the precautionary principle. The negotiation would be facilitated if
only like-minded players would take a seat around the table and if Tokyo roundera codes61 were re-introduced.
It would be paradoxical if the world trading community trusted the WTO
membership for adjudication, but not for legislation. The WTO is not an
adjudication only forum, like the International Court of Justice (ICJ).62 It
adjudicates only disputes coming under its aegis, i.e., negotiated between the
trading nations under its auspices.63 When the legislative function ceases, then a
very powerful warning signal has been sent to the judicial function as well.
III. THE OPTIONS FOR THE WTO
In a 1962 speech at West Point (the United States Military Academy), Dean
Acheson, the great American statesman, famously quipped that “Great Britain
has lost an Empire and not yet found a role.”64 All proportions guarded, this is
where the WTO is now. FTAs have taken away a substantial part of the WTO’s
agenda, while the WTO is still debating how it can stay relevant.
The judicial function has to be re-established, even if we continue to
observe the membership voting with its feet and moving towards FTAs. Disputes
originating in the Uruguay round agreements continue to emerge and need to be
addressed somewhere. But the legislative inertia of the WTO must be addressed
as well. We can take it for granted that, because of its membership
heterogeneity—the WTO’s 164 members are about to become 168,65 making it
look more and more like the UN—the WTO will have to be limited to “shallow
integration” (basically agreements calling for non-discriminatory behavior) at
the multilateral level. As it stands, the WTO contains three layers of obligations
embedded in:
• Multilateral agreements, which bind all WTO members (Layer 1);
• Plurilateral agreements, which bind only their signatories (Layer 2);
• Protocols of accession, which are idiosyncratic, and bind the acceding
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country only (Layer 3).66
Layers 1 and 3 do not need to change. The question is all about Layer 2.
This layer overlaps to some extent with the content of FTAs and DTAs, but the
DTAs contain WTO+ and WTOx obligations67 which are known in Layers 1 and
3. Just like Layer 2 though, FTAs are selective clubs. The question for the WTO
to continue its policy relevance in the future could be phrased as the following
options:
• Should it allow deep integration (WTO+ and WTOx) to continue to
flourish outside its confines?; or
• Should it attempt to bring it within its four doors? What does it take to
divert the appetite for trade agreements within the confines of the
multilateral edifice? Or, more simply, how can the WTO mimic the
attractiveness of FTAs?
If the former option is taken, the WTO cannot stay idle. It will have to find
ways to build bridges to the trade community, which continues to legislate away
from Geneva. If not, it will be restricted to an ageing multilateral framework, as
the probability to sign multilateral agreements decreases. Increasing
membership and heterogeneity are the reason for pessimism in this respect. To
keep its policy relevance, WTO must renew its legislative arsenal, and one lowcost way to do it is by incorporating elements already successfully negotiated in
the realm of FTAs. For example, there are dozens of FTAs which include
provisions regarding the relevance of the Harmonized System in the
classification of goods.68 Why can the WTO not add a provision to this effect,
and avoid disputes like EC-Chicken Cuts in the future?69 There must be some
low-hanging fruit in this context that could be multilateralized. The dialogue
between the FTAs and DTAs on one hand, and the WTO on the other, must be
ongoing. This would be one way for multilateralizing some of the FTA/DTAcontent.
If the latter option is taken, it will have to make its Layer 2 more attractive.
But it will not be in a position to do that unless the currently prevailing formula
of a single undertaking is abandoned. In this scenario, moving to variable
geometry70 is the means for the WTO to revive its currently moribund legislative
66
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function. Furthermore, if we stick to the current formula of Annex 4 agreements,
the latter option will never be a substitute for the former option. Annex 4
agreements are issue-specific, whereas FTAs, even when they are not allencompassing, include wide coverage as shown by a very comprehensive study
of the World Bank.71 Thus, both described options should be viewed as
complements, rather than substitutes.
Finally, there is ample evidence of an appetite for trade deals, as the everincreasing number of FTAs/DTAs shows. Irrespective whether one endorses the
rent-seeking, terms-of-trade, or commitment-theory explanation for trade
agreements,72 trade agreements are necessary for trade liberalization to occur
between the members of the world trading community.
IV. IT TAKES MORE THAN TWO TO TANGO, THIS TIME
The new WTO DG will be appointed shortly and their hands will be full.
They need to address the issues discussed in this article, but no matter how
competent they prove to be, they cannot do it without the active support of the
membership. All membership should be behind the efforts to re-start the WTO
engine, but some more than others.
Up until the Uruguay round, decisions followed a similar pattern: as long
as the EU and the U.S. shared a worldview, and were dancing in the same
direction, the world trading community would follow. That is not the case
anymore. We have now moved to a multi-polar world where voices are
multiplying and diversifying. We are experiencing a cacophony when a single
tune is required. The world needs to come together in the Swiss headquarters of
the WTO and compose its own multilateral Alpine yodel. This is no cakewalk,
but one key piece of the jigsaw puzzle seems to be abandoning its previous
centrifugal tendency and move towards acting in a centripetal manner. President
Joseph Biden’s call to arms is in favor of working with other nations towards
healing and uniting America and, also, the world.73 Hopefully, the WTO favors
his world agenda.
One last observation is warranted: the grievances that the U.S. has put
before the WTO in recent years have not gone away, and some of them will not
go away either. And it is important to distinguish between substance and process.
that some of the members of a wider organization agree to disciplines, which bind only them and
not the whole membership. See Elisa Tino, The Variable Geometry in the Experience of Regional
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Antidumping Agreement. Id. at 353–54.
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The abrupt manner in which the Trump administration dismantled the Appellate
Body, and threw the entire WTO dispute settlement system into jeopardy, should
not be confused with the substantive criticism that successive U.S.
administrations have voiced. Even though the U.S. was alone in disregarding the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)74 disciplines, it was not alone in
voicing criticism.75
Surely, the worldview of the Trump administration (its trade policy
included) is an oddity when compared to the traditional U.S. approach to
international relations, as Joseph S. Nye, among others, have shown. 76 In an oped in the Financial Times, Francis Fukuyama went so far as to state that:
“America’s choice . . . signifies a switching of sides from the liberal
internationalist camp, to the populist nationalist one.”77
Borrowing from Haass, the view of the Trump administration was that
foreign policy is an “expensive distraction.”78 Where previous presidents
invested in building coalitions and establishing international cooperation, former
President Trump divested. The Trump administration was a largely transactional
administration, when instead building a system and maintaining the system
requires the exact opposite attitude. A transactional attitude is highly consistent
with populist tendencies. Giving in to populism means giving up compulsory
third-party adjudication, the foundational element of WTO adjudication. The
U.S. did that. But, it bears repeating, we need to distinguish between U.S.
criticism and U.S. attitude. The U.S. did raise some points worth reflecting upon
regarding WTO dispute adjudication, and the manner it was evolving. The
institutionally embedded mechanism to address grievances—the DSU
74
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Review—proved to be an inadequate forum to help dissipate U.S. concerns. All
this to state, President Biden might turn a page when it comes to attitude, but
will most likely take a couple of leaves from the U.S. book of expressed
grievances when moving forward on the trade front. The first step for President
Biden will of course, be a request to renew his Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA), so that he can negotiate at the international plane. 79
V. A YEAR FROM NOW
“I’m not crazy about reality, but it’s still the only place to get a decent
meal.”80 – Groucho Marx
Groucho Marx’s quote probably best sums up the attitude that trading
nations should adopt when they meet next in Geneva. It is not easy to replace
the WTO and plunging into uncertainty by returning to less than multilateral
trade institutions creates risks, which are difficult to measure. Trade policy
should be analytically approached and in a self-contained manner, because it
becomes almost unmanageable—analytically, that is—to view it as part and
parcel of international relations. But it is part and parcel of international relations
and moving one piece from the overall jigsaw puzzle might have a domino
effect.
A second-best WTO is preferable to a non-WTO scenario, because of the
cost of not having a WTO risks not being self-contained. It risks contaminating
the wider realm of international relations. This is the time of incremental,
positive steps in the right direction. It would be very appropriate indeed if the
trade leaders were to take a leaf from the GATT tradition of pragmatism—that
Robert E. Hudec explained in unparalleled manner—and start addressing the
real problems one-by-one.81
Reality does not lend much to optimism as things stand. But the
counterfactual is worrisome.
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